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This article examines potential cost reductions in the market for balancing power by pooling all four 
German control areas. In a united control area both the procurement and the production of balancing 
power may be more efficient than in four separated control areas. Our data contain published bids on 
energy procurement as well as balancing power flows in the period from December 2007 to November 
2008. A reference scenario simulates the market results for primary and secondary balancing power, 
as well as minutes reserve. Subsequently, we simulate a united control area by pooling the historical 
bids of each control area and by netting the area imbalances. We show that in the period under review 
the total costs of procured and produced balancing power are reduced by 17 %. The production costs 
for secondary balancing power are reduced by even 45 %. 
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1. Introduction 
There are four control areas in the German electricity market in which positive and negative balancing 
power is activated at the same time. This article examines the cost reduction potential by pooling all 
control areas using historical data.  
By pooling the four German control areas three major efficiency gains may be obtained. First, the 
provision of balancing power can be reduced. Haubrich (2008) computes the potential economies of 
scope of a united control area and concludes that the provision of positive balancing power can be 
reduced from 5813 MW to 5404 MW and of negative balancing power from 4391 MW to 3356 MW, 
respectively.
1  As  the  provision  of  balancing  power  is  compensated  with  a  demand  charge,  the 
reduction of procured balancing power can lead to a significant cost reduction. In any case the amount 
of provided balancing power is a matter of security of supply. We did not want to go into this debate 
as it is covered richly elsewhere.
2 Consequently, in our simulation we just kept the amount of provided 
energy  fixed.  Other things  being  equal  our results  thus  indicate a  lower  bound  of  cost  reduction 
potentials. Along the way the observed effects can be analyzed more easily. 
Second, a major potential cost reduction can be expected from netting antipodal use of balancing 
power in different control areas. Since each control area is balanced independently, the area imbalance 
– the difference between planned and actual power flows – in one control area can be positive and the 
imbalance in another can be negative. A netting of area imbalances results in a cost reduction because 
the use of balancing power is compensated with an energy rate. Furthermore, since the supplier with 
the least energy rate is activated first, a reduction of balancing power reduces the level of energy rates. 
Third, the procurement auctions could be more efficient in a single German control area. Currently, 
only  a  small  fraction  of  suppliers  are  bidding  in  all  control  areas  because  they  are  required  to 
prequalify in all control areas separately. The prequalification is meant to guarantee that a power 
                                                       
1 Cf. Haubrich (2008). 
2 Cf. for example Brückl (2006) who develops a rather technical model for the determination of the demand for 
balancing power. Haubrich (2008) computes the demand for procured energy for a single German control area. 
Oren (2005) chooses a more theoretical approach to security of supply in competitive electricity markets. 3 
 
station is technically feasible to supply balancing power. As the prequalification process is costly, 
most suppliers offer their generation capacities in only one control area, thereby leading to a market 
segmentation.
3 In a united control area there are more suppliers of balancing power than in each of the 
current four control areas which may also reduce demand and energy rates.  
The goal of this article is the numerical determination of potential cost reductions with historical data 
by pooling the control areas. We start by building a reference scenario which represents the actual 
status quo of the German balancing power market: the control areas will be balanced independently 
from each other and the suppliers are required a separate prequalification for each control area. The 
reference scenario gives us reconstructed demand and energy rates which are used to compare our 
model with the actual market results. Subsequently, we assume a united control area by pooling all 
bids and netting the area imbalances. Therefore, the united control area is fictional in the way that 
historical bids and area imbalances are used.
4 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces the German market 
for  balancing  power. The  third  section  describes the  data. The fourth  section  contains the  model 
description and the fifth section contains the scenario results. The sixth section concludes. 
  
2. The German market for balancing power 
Consumers and producers of electricity compose an electrical circuit in which the energy feed-in must 
equal the energy feed-out at all times. Whenever this is not the case, a power imbalance occurs. Such a 
power imbalance can result from unanticipated events such as a power station failure or errors in the 
load  forecast.  As  a  consequence,  the  power  frequency  changes  which  can  result  in  a  complete 
breakdown  of  the  power  grid.  In  the  case  of  a  too  high  (low)  energy  feed-in,  a  power  surplus 
                                                       
3 The Monopolkommission (the German monopoly commission) states that the prequalification process is the 
main reason for the low number of suppliers of secondary balancing power. See Monopolkommission (2009), p. 
157. 
4 For computation we used GAMS Version 23.0.2. 4 
 
(shortage)  occurs  and  the  power  frequency  rises  (falls).  Following  UCTE  guidelines,  the  power 
frequency  must  equal  50 Hz.  The  stabilization  of  the  power  frequency  is  assigned  to  the  TSO 
(Transmission System Operator) and is part of the ancillary services he has to provide. Other ancillary 
services  are  voltage  stabilization,  re-establishing  the  grid  after  a  breakdown  and  the  overall  net 
management.  
The German power grid is divided into four control areas which have to be balanced at all times. Their 
TSOs  are  subsidiaries  of  the  four  big  energy  providers  in  Germany:  EnBW,  E.On,  RWE  and 
Vattenfall. Each of these control areas consists of 100 to 200 balancing areas which pool energy feed-
ins and feed-outs and are controlled by a balancing authority.  
There are three different types of balancing power, namely primary, secondary, and tertiary balancing 
power. The latter is also termed minutes reserve. These are distinguished by activation times and 
duration of operation. Primary balancing power has to be fully activated within 30 seconds and must 
remain operational for at least 15 minutes. Secondary balancing power succeeds the primary balancing 
power and has to be fully activated in 5 to 15 minutes after a grid imbalance. Both primary and 
secondary  balancing  power  are  activated  automatically.  Tertiary  balancing  power  is  managed 
manually and replaces the secondary balancing power after 15 minutes and remains online for up to 60 
minutes.
5 
In the procurement of balancing power, the TSO has a monopsony. To remedy the potential market 
power of the TSO, the procurement must take place in an anonymous, open auction to guarantee a 
non-discriminatory  access  to  the  market  to  all  suppliers.
6  The  auction  should  minimize  the 
procurement  costs.  The  German  regulation  authority,  Bundesnetzagentur,  has  opted  for  multi-
dimensional, multi-unit auctions to procure secondary and tertiary balancing power since two services 
are procured simultaneously, namely the provision and – in the case of a control area imbalance – the 
production of balancing power. Therefore, a bid consists of two prices: on the one hand a demand rate 
with the dimension €/MW for the provision of capacity and on the other hand an energy rate with the 
                                                       
5 Cf. Wawer (2007) and Swider (2007). 
6 Cf. StromNZV and Bundesnetzagentur (2008a). 5 
 
dimension €/MWh for the activation of the capacity is paid.
7 As the activated primary balancing power 
cannot be measured for technical reasons, in this case a bid consists only of a demand rate. All bids are 
ordered according to their demand rates and all bids are accepted until the determined demand is met. 
This  procedure  is  called  “scoring  rule”.  Afterwards,  the  accepted  bids  for  secondary  and  tertiary 
balancing power are ordered according to their energy rates. In the case of a power imbalance the 
supplier with the lowest energy rate is activated first. This is called “settlement rule”. As the auction 
design is “pay-as-bid”, a successful bidder gets exactly the price he bid. This is opposed to uniform 
pricing which is applied, for instance, in the German day-ahead market. 
 
3. Data  
We use data of 12 consecutive months from December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008. All data after 
November  2008  were  not  used,  because  in  December  2008  a  co-operation  between  the  TSOs  of 
EnBW, E.On and Vattenfall started to reduce antipodal use of balancing power. As this may have 
caused a structural break in the data, we limited the time horizon to 12 months. All data was obtained 
from the websites of the TSOs who on behalf of the Bundesnetzagentur are obliged to publish a wide 
range of grid statistics. Our dataset is split into auction data which is dealt with in the first subsection, 
and activation data which is contained in the second subsection.  
3.1 Auctions 
Since December 1, 2007 primary and secondary balancing power are auctioned monthly. In the case of 
secondary balancing power the auction is split between peak and off-peak phases. The peak phase 
covers all workdays between 8 am and 8 pm, the off-peak phase covers all other times including 
weekends and public holidays. The differentiation between peak and off-peak times expresses the 
significant changes in the electricity market throughout the day. Tertiary balancing power is auctioned 
daily in 4-hours-time-slices. 
                                                       
7 Cf. Chao (2002).  
Therefore,  we  have  17  different  auctions  for  balancing  power:  one  monthly  auction  for  primary 
balancing  power,  four  monthly  auctions  for  positive  and  negative,  peak  and  off
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Tables 1 a/b show the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of bid sizes, demand rates, 
and energy rates. For positive secondary balancing power, depicted in table 1a, both the demand rates 
and the energy rates are on average higher in peak times than in off-peak times. This results from 
higher costs of opportunity of power stations during peak time. 
   bid size (MW)  demand rate (€/MW)  energy rate (€/MWh) 
   peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak 
Mean  206.1667  208.0899  5641.844  3448.692  157.3394  111.3185 
Std. dev.  258.0763  253.9685  1130.713  347.8984  91.36015  41.10115 
Maximum  1250  1250  12607.75  5660  770  275 
Minimum  30  30  2130  2222  71  55 
Obs.  180  178  180  178  180  178 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics of accepted bids for positive secondary balancing power 
 
As bidders on negative balancing power receive energy, the bidding logic differs from that of positive 
balancing power. Many suppliers of negative balancing power are content with a zero payment and 
both the average demand rates and the average energy rates are much lower than for positive balancing 
power.  
   bid size (MW)  demand rate (€/MW)  energy rate (€/MWh) 
   peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak 
Mean  184.75  184.1139  2418.139  2525.643  7.215625  1.503797 
Std. dev.  169.7999  159.0162  1397.105  2173.33  7.339235  2.241165 
Maximum  1000  1000  6500  13619  26  10 
Minimum  30  30  900  958.75  0  0 
Obs.  160  158  160  158  160  158 
Table 1b: Descriptive statistics of accepted bids for negative secondary balancing power 
 
Note that the demand rates for negative secondary balancing power are on average higher in off-peak 
times than they are in peak times. The explanation for this is simple: A supplier of negative energy has 
to be able to reduce his energy supply or to increase his demand. A power station that is suitable to 
deliver balancing power may not be in the money during nighttime. Hence, it would have to sell 
energy  at  a  price  below its  marginal  cost  of  production  in  order  to  participate  in the  market  for 
negative balancing power. Likewise, a consumer who is suitable to deliver negative balancing power 8 
 
may not want to increase his demand during nighttime. He thus has to be compensated with either very 
low or even negative energy rates – which were not approved until January 2009 – or a high demand 
rate.
8 In summary, in off-peak phases suppliers of negative balancing power will offer their capacities 
only for a comparably high price.  
As tertiary balancing power is auctioned daily in 4-hour-time-slices, we observe immensely more bids 
compared to primary or secondary balancing power. Our data contains 439,560 bids for positive and 
310,079 bids for negative tertiary balancing power of which 69.6 % and 52.3 % were accepted. Since 
12 auctions occurred per day, each auction on average had 200 bids for positive and 141 bids for 
negative tertiary balancing power. The rationale for bidding on positive and negative tertiary balancing 
power corresponds to secondary balancing power. In order to allow an easy comparison between 
secondary and tertiary balancing power, we have pooled all 4-hours-time-slices according to the peak 
and off-peak times of secondary balancing power.  
Tables  2  a/b  show  some  descriptive  statistics  of  accepted  bids  for  positive  and  negative  tertiary 
balancing power. As in the case of secondary balancing power, the energy rates are higher in peak 
times than in off-peak times. The relative difference between peak and off-peak times is even sharper 
than in the case of secondary balancing power. 
 
   bid size (MW)  demand rate (€/MW)  energy rate (€/MWh) 
   peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak 
Mean  23.05799  23.13869  52.29035  11.17283  450.618  368.2667 
Std. dev.  16.43457  16.52675  74.25524  18.61212  283.282  248.2026 
Maximum  150  150  762.5  3000  2001  1600 
Minimum  15  15  0  0  100  98 
Obs.  110889  195095  110889  195095  110889  195095 
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics of accepted bids for positive tertiary balancing power 
 
 
                                                       
8 Cf. Bundesnetzagentur (2008b). 9 
 
   bid size (MW)  demand rate (€/MW)  energy rate (€/MWh) 
   peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak  peak  off-peak 
Mean  26.80454  25.67073  1.166663  16.7398  2.161859  0.304751 
Std. dev.  23.19333  20.60374  1.450946  21.94096  2.546771  0.933049 
Maximum  180  160  31.5  200  28  10 
Minimum  15  15  0  0  0  0 
Obs.  56989  105376  56989  105376  56989  105376 
Table 2b: Descriptive statistics of accepted bids for negative tertiary balancing power 
 
Note that the comparably low demand rates are due to the fact that suppliers of tertiary balancing 
power  have  to  commit  their  capacities  for  only  four  hours  and  not,  as  in  the  case  of  secondary 
balancing power, for one month. As is the case for secondary balancing power, the average demand 
rates for negative tertiary balancing power are more expensive in off-peak times.  
3.2 Activation of balancing power 
The data of produced balancing power are published by the TSOs for every quarter of an hour, i.e. for 
twelve months we have 35,136 observation points. In the original data both positive and negative 
balancing power were regularly declared within the same control area in the same quarter of an hour 
which is due to the data frequency. In these cases the amounts were netted.  
Altogether 28,857 GWh of secondary balancing power were activated which consisted of 10,484 GWh 
of positive and 18,373 GWh of negative power flows, i.e. in sum there were more negative than there 
were positive power flows. Additionally, the chance of an activation of negative secondary balancing 
power was higher than an activation of positive secondary balancing power.  
Table 3a overviews the magnitude of activated secondary balancing power for each control area. The 





Table 3a: Descriptive statistics of activated positive and negative secondary balancing power 
 
Tertiary  balancing  power  was  activated  with  a  total  of  9,708  GWh  whereof  58 %  was  negative 
balancing power. Furthermore, tertiary balancing power was activated not nearly as frequently as 
secondary balancing power: only in 5 % of all quarters of an hour, tertiary balancing power was used. 
Table 3b gives the descriptive statistics for minutes reserve.  
Table 3b: Descriptive statistics of activated positive and negative tertiary balancing power 
 
4. The model 
The total costs of balancing power consist of the procurement costs (PC) and the activation costs (AC). 
We use a two-stage, linear programming model to simulate the market of balancing power. Figure 2 
gives an account of the model sequence. 
ENBW  E.ON  RWE  VET 
positive  negative  positive  negative  positive  negative  positive  negative 
 Mean [MW]   36.099   79.961   83.467   149.84   137.63   195.16   48.660   134.59 
 Median [MW]   0.0000   23.100   0.0000   136.10   0.0000   57.000   0.0000   84.900 
 Maximum [MW]   572.50   1166.9   1292.3   968.50   2000.1   1832.0   580.00   766.60 
 Minimum [MW]   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
 Std. Dev. [MW]   61.089   121.52   147.48   141.67   233.54   267.78   92.071   149.24 
 Skewness   2.2034   2.2049   2.0571   0.5289   2.2335   1.6167   2.2239   0.9053 
 Kurtosis   8.9921   8.7063   8.1568   2.3095   8.8283   5.5407   7.8508   2.8021 
 Obs.   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136 
ENBW  E.ON  RWE  VET 
positive  negative  positive  negative  positive  negative  positive  negative 
 Mean [MW]   0.236   0.9661   6.2938   1.4518   9.6767   16.480   0.6097   4.0922 
 Median[MW]   0.000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
 Max. [MW]   231.0   449.00   800.00   550.00   1054.0   948.00   397.00   555.00 
 Min. [MW]   0.000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
 StdDev[MW]   5.721   14.550   46.614   18.085   63.083   80.303   13.005   33.041 
 Skewness   27.86   18.686   9.1940   14.943   8.3979   5.7389   23.980   9.2492 
 Kurtosis   863.1   411.14   103.53   264.35   85.990   39.592   627.34   97.467 
 Obs.   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136   35136 11 
 
 
Figure 2: Model sequence 
 
The procurement determines which bids on balancing power are accepted. The procurement costs are 
minimized and we thus have the following objective function: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ⋅ =
b t c c t b c t b m dr PC , , , ,
min!
.              (1) 
The  first  sigma  summarizes  all  bids  b.  As  we  observe  several  periods  (i.e.  12  months,  or 
35,136 quarters of an hour), the second sigma summarizes all periods t, measured in quarters of an 
hour. Finally we have to take into account that there are four control areas. Hence, the third sigma 
summarizes all control areas c. Each bid on the procurement consists of a demand rate dr and a 
maximum amount m. The bids are valid for several periods and for at least one control area. Naturally, 
they are differentiated between secondary balancing power msec and tertiary balancing power mter. In 
summary, the objective function chooses those suppliers with the lowest demand rate. 
Obviously,  we  have  to  face  some  constraints.  It  has  to  be  guaranteed  that  the  sum  of  procured 
balancing power m is equal to the required quantity  m in each control area. That means  m must be 
identical to the total auctioned balancing power such that 
c t b c t b m m , , , = ∑   for every quarter of an hour t and all control areas c.    (2) 
In the second phase of the model, all bids b are ordered according to the settlement rule to balance 
control area imbalances with minimum costs: 
1.  Procurement:  
Which bids on balancing power are accepted (scoring rule)? 
1a. Computation of accepted bids on 
secondary balancing power 
1b. Computation of accepted bids on 
tertiary balancing power 
2. Activated balancing power:   
Which balancing power is activated (settlement rule)? 
2a. Computation of activated secondary 
balancing power 
2b. Computation of activated tertiary 
balancing power 12 
 
∑ ∑∑ ⋅ =
b t c c t b c t b x er AC , , , ,
min!
,              (3) 
i.e. on the basis of the energy rates er it is determined which supplier is activated. Although trivial, it 
has to  be  assured that  the  activated  energy  x  of  each  supplier  is  equal  or lower  than the  bidden 
maximum m such that  
∑ ∑ ≤
c c t b c c t b m x , , , ,   for all bids b and every quarter of an hour t.      (4) 
For every t the control area imbalance (CAI) has to be compensated with activated balancing power x. 
c t b c t b CAI x , , , = ∑   for every quarter of an hour t and all control areas c.    (5) 
Like the procured balancing power, the activated balancing power x consists of secondary xsec and 
tertiary balancing power xter. 
Before we analyze the results let us first look at the accuracy of the model. TSOs are obliged to 
publish the average weighted energy rates (AWER). These contain information about the activated 









In short, the average weighted energy rates contain almost all information we are interested in, albeit 
on a high level of aggregation. This is why they are well suited to test our scenario outcomes.  
We calculated the AWERs on the basis of our simulation (denoted with “SIM”) and compared them 
with the AWERs published by the TSOs (“DATA”). Table 4 summarizes some descriptive statistics for 




   AWER ENBW  AWER EON  AWER RWE  AWER VET 
   DATA  SIM  DATA  SIM  DATA  SIM  DATA  SIM 
 Mean  60.101  58.240  36.749  36.434  52.404  49.094  53.027  47.192 
 Median  61.000  61.000  0.000  0.000  2.000  2.000  3.000  2.750 
 Maximum  475.000  289.370  322.000  282.060  599.000  331.760  501.000  262.190 
 Minimum  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Std. Dev.  47.566  49.913  52.906  53.234  65.956  60.071  71.113  63.556 
 Skewness  0.213  0.130  0.940  0.985  1.104  0.811  0.736  0.772 
 Kurtosis  1.924  1.626  2.322  2.586  4.017  2.461  1.877  1.801 
Correlation  0.984  0.993  0.977  0.975 
                    
 Obs.  35136  35136  35136  35136  35136  35136  35136  35136 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of average weighted energy rates 
 
In all four cases our simulated mean is close to the historical mean. For all four TSOs, t-tests for 
equality  of  means,  medians  and  variances  between  the  time  series  were  highly  significant.  The 
deviations originate to the most part from following aspect: In the original data, at times periods occur 
with extremely high energy rates. This might be due to technical restrictions with which TSOs are 
faced  in  reality.  Our  model  cannot  capture  these periods  as  it  misses  the information that  would 
explain the energy rates. Consequently, our simulated maximum energy rates are much lower than the 
maxima observed in the data. Another reason for deviations appears to be the order in which market 
participants are called. In some periods, the TSO does not call the cheapest supplier but instead, for 
example, the second cheapest. It is not clear why this is the case but it might, again, be due to technical 
reasons. Concerning the medians, the case of VET is somewhat special as the data tells us that a 
supplier with an energy rate of 3 €/MWh is frequently called. However, this supplier does not appear 
in the auction data and hence does not appear in our simulation. 
 
5. Scenario results 
We examine two scenarios with scenario 1 as reference scenario in which the market results of the 
current system are reconstructed. In scenario 2 all bids on balancing power are pooled and all area 
imbalances  are  netted  thus  simulating  one  single  German  control  area.  We  thereby  assume  a 14 
 
sufficiently high grid capacity. Since no permanent network shortages have occurred in Germany as 
yet, this assumption appears to be reasonable. 
5.1 Scenario 1 
The reference scenario simulates the market for balancing power as it was before December 2008, i.e. 
the balancing power is auctioned separately for each control area and the area imbalances are also 
balanced independently. The suppliers are required to be prequalified for each control area. Table 5 
reviews the monthly costs for each type of balancing power. 
   PCp  PCsec  ACsec  PCter  ACter 
December-07  7.61  21.66  26.07  42.18  0.99 
January-08  8.03  18.71  26.26  15.40  2.15 
February-08  8.23  17.36  23.34  13.09  0.80 
March-08  8.45  18.95  29.24  10.16  2.28 
April-08  8.51  17.91  39.74  20.59  3.24 
May-08  8.57  18.31  34.24  12.09  3.64 
June-08  9.10  18.31  29.80  30.46  4.03 
July-08  9.83  20.59  36.43  15.29  5.03 
August-08  10.93  20.24  23.12  14.64  2.18 
September-08  11.34  19.80  34.35  18.33  3.44 
October-08  11.99  20.06  29.00  22.67  2.35 
November-08  12.24  18.50  19.73  12.64  0.65 
Total  114.83  230.40  351.31  227.54  30.75 
Table 5: Results of scenario 1 in million euros 
The total costs add up to 954.83 million euro. The procurement costs for primary balancing power 
make up for 12 % of the total costs. Although the costs for primary balancing power do not show a 
high volatility, they have a noticeably increasing trend. This may be on account of increasing costs of 
combustibles in 2008 but requires further investigation. Procurement costs as well as activation costs 
for  secondary  balancing  power  are  rather  constant.  Tertiary  balancing  power  shows  much  more 
volatility in both procurement and activation costs. The latter is due to the very infrequent activation 
rates: In some periods no tertiary balancing power has to be activated at all whereas in others there are 
major imbalances leading to a massive increase in demand. The reason for the volatile procurement 
costs of tertiary balancing power is less obvious but might be due to the auction design. Auctioning on 
a daily basis may introduce more volatility than auctioning on a monthly basis because short term  
events such as power station breakdowns can be taken into account. On a monthly basis this is not 
possible, hence the participants bid expected rather than actual demand rates.
Figure 3: Shares in total costs of different types of 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, secondary 
total costs. Although tertiary balancing power
a higher share in overall activation costs.
thereby  compensating  for  the  lower 
secondary and tertiary balancing power
Primary balancing power is not affected by pooling the control
is the same throughout both scenarios and hence will not be considered
nonetheless, owing to a different size of the pie.
5.2 Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 assumes a united German control a
single auction and control area 
positive  imbalance  and  another  control  area  has  a  negative 
resulting  imbalance  would  be  zero.  Therefore,  special  restrictions  of  control  areas  such  as  the 
events such as power station breakdowns can be taken into account. On a monthly basis this is not 
possible, hence the participants bid expected rather than actual demand rates. 
of different types of balancing power in scenario 1
, secondary balancing power with altogether 61 % has 
tertiary balancing power has higher energy rates, secondary 
a higher share in overall activation costs. This is not surprising as it is activated much more often, 
thereby  compensating  for  the  lower  energy  rates.  Procurement  costs  are  quite  similar  for  both 
balancing power. 
is not affected by pooling the control areas so that the absolute level 
scenarios and hence will not be considered any further
nonetheless, owing to a different size of the pie. 
Scenario 2 assumes a united German control area. Therefore, the balancing power
area imbalances are netted. For example, if one control area has a large 
and  another  control  area  has  a  negative  imbalance  with  equal  magnitude,  the 
would  be  zero.  Therefore,  special  restrictions  of  control  areas  such  as  the 
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enario 1 
has the greatest share in 
rates, secondary balancing power has 
This is not surprising as it is activated much more often, 
rates.  Procurement  costs  are  quite  similar  for  both 
areas so that the absolute level of costs 
any further. Its share may vary 
balancing power is procured in a 
netted. For example, if one control area has a large 
with  equal  magnitude,  the 
would  be  zero.  Therefore,  special  restrictions  of  control  areas  such  as  the 16 
 
prequalification process for each control area or rules directing that a specific share of balancing 
power has to be procured in a given control area are not relevant anymore. Consequently, the costs are 
reduced significantly compared to scenario 1. 
The required quantity of balancing power  m remains unchanged, i.e. the same quantity of balancing 
power is procured in scenario 1 and 2. But as the bids of all control areas are pooled and only such 
bids are accepted that are efficient in a united control area, the procurement auction results differ in the 
two scenarios. 
   PCp  PCsec  ACsec  PCter  ACter 
December-07  7.61  20.32  15.41  42.18  1.11 
January-08  8.03  18.51  11.66  15.40  2.12 
February-08  8.23  17.50  9.77  13.09  0.84 
March-08  8.45  18.70  14.33  10.15  2.00 
April-08  8.51  17.79  28.31  20.59  3.18 
May-08  8.57  18.53  23.00  12.09  3.69 
June-08  9.10  18.40  16.26  30.48  3.98 
July-08  9.83  20.59  19.71  15.29  4.94 
August-08  10.93  20.28  10.86  14.64  2.12 
September-08  11.34  19.80  20.43  18.34  3.14 
October-08  11.99  20.25  15.64  22.50  2.18 
November-08  12.24  18.74  5.34  12.64  0.52 
Total  114.83  229.41  190.69  227.39  29.81 
Table 6: Results of scenario 2 in million euros 
 
Table 6 shows the scenario results. As stated above, primary balancing power is fixed for all scenarios. 
Looking at the costs of secondary balancing power, it is easily determined that there is a reduction in 
total costs.  
Procurement costs are down to 229.41 million euro from 230.4 million euro in scenario 1. This implies 
a cost reduction of 1 million euro. The reason does not lie in a reduction of quantity, as the quantity of 
procured energy is fixed, but in the more efficient auction design. The difference from scenario 1 is 
that all bids on balancing power are pooled. This has, of course, implications on the activation costs. 
Looking, for instance, at the auction for positive secondary balancing power, a certain bidder A is only 17 
 
prequalified for RWE’s control area. A has a demand rate of 59 euros and an energy rate of 3800 
euros. The bid was not accepted. Another bidder B is prequalified for all control areas, with a demand 
rate of 199 euros and an energy rate of 3942 euros. Both values are considerably higher than those of 
A. In spite of this B was accepted, owing to B’s superior prequalification. In scenario 2, however, 
every bid is supposed to be prequalified for each of the control areas. Accordingly, in scenario 2, A is 
accepted, whereas B is not. The procurement costs are thus slightly reduced. However, this result 
should be handled cautiously as a change in auction design may change the bidders’ behavior. 
Because of the netting of the control area imbalances the costs of secondary balancing power decrease 
by 160.62 million euro from 351.31 million euro to 190.69 million euro which is equivalent to a cost 
reduction of 45 %. The reason for this major reduction is twofold. First, there is a reduction in quantity 
as antipodal use of balancing power no more exists. The second effect stems, again, from the more 
efficient auction design. In the example above, not only had A the lower demand rate, but also a lower 
energy rate than B. So in scenario 2 we have more efficient suppliers compared to scenario 1. This 
effect alone leads to a cost reduction from 351.31 to 351.17 million euro. Apparently, this effect plays 
a minor role compared to the effect of netting the control area imbalances. This effect makes up for the 
remainder of the reduction – that is to say from 351.17 to 190.69 million euro. 
The cost reduction potentials of tertiary balancing power are limited for the following reasons. First, 
the  greater  part  of  the  procured  reserve  is  already  auctioned  across  all  control  areas  so  that  the 
procurement costs cannot be amply reduced. Accordingly, the procurement costs are reduced only by 
.15 million euro from 227.54 to 227.39 million euro. Second, there are hardly periods with activated 
tertiary balancing power in more than one control area at the same time so the netting effect is quite 
small. Consequently, costs of balancing power decrease only by .94 million euro from 30.75 million 
euro in scenario 1 to 29.81 million euro in scenario 2.  
Having almost constant total costs of primary and tertiary balancing power and a major cost reduction 
of  secondary  balancing  power  it  is  easily  ascertained  that  the  share  of  total  costs  of  secondary 
balancing power decreases sharply – that is to say the share decreases from 61 % in scenario 1 to 53 % 
in scenario 2. This is illustrated in figure 4.  
Figure 4: Shares in total costs of different types of 
 
By  pooling  all  four  control  areas,  the  importance  of  secondary 
primary and tertiary balancing power
from 954.83 million euro in scenario 1 to 
reduction of 17 %. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has shown that by pooling the four German control areas into
major efficiency gains can be achieved. 
procurement of balancing power, a reduction of activated balancing power and more efficient auctions. 
The former effect was deliberately not considered in this 
bound of potential cost reductions. 
reductions of 162.70 million euro were computed. This reduction comes most
second effect, i.e. the reduction of activated balancing power. We showed that 
of  activated  secondary  balancing  power  is  most  important. 
of different types of balancing power in scenario 2
By  pooling  all  four  control  areas,  the  importance  of  secondary  balancing  diminishes  in  favor  of
tertiary balancing power. The systems total cost thereby decrease by 
in scenario 1 to 792.13 million euro in scenario 2. This corresponds to a
shown that by pooling the four German control areas into one single control area 
major efficiency gains can be achieved. We identified three sources of potential cost reductions: Less 
procurement of balancing power, a reduction of activated balancing power and more efficient auctions. 
berately not considered in this article. Our results thus constitute a lower 
bound of potential cost reductions. By netting the area imbalances and by pooling all reserve bids
million euro were computed. This reduction comes mostly on account of 
second effect, i.e. the reduction of activated balancing power. We showed that above all
of  activated  secondary  balancing  power  is  most  important.  The  effect  of  more  efficient  auctions 
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in scenario 2 
diminishes  in  favor  of 
cost thereby decrease by 162.70 million euro 
This corresponds to a cost 
one single control area 
We identified three sources of potential cost reductions: Less 
procurement of balancing power, a reduction of activated balancing power and more efficient auctions. 
. Our results thus constitute a lower 
and by pooling all reserve bids, cost 
ly on account of the 
above all the reduction 
The  effect  of  more  efficient  auctions 19 
 
originates from the current prequalification process which leads to a strong market segmentation. In a 
united control area this segmentation is nullified.  
Under the assumption of a sufficiently high grid capacity we conclude that the situation in the German 
market for balancing power as of November 2008 was inefficient. Under the current status, with the 
TSOs  of  E.On,  EnBW  and  Vattenfall  reducing  antipodal  use  of  balancing  power,  this  may  have 
improved. Still, we strongly suggest a co-operation agreement between all TSOs in order to realize all 
potential efficiency gains. 
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